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Saturday, February 27, 2016

The patriarch’s new clothes

Ukrainians need no one's permission to form their own churches
Hans Christian Andersen wrote a wonderful tale entitled “The Emperor’s New Clothes.” Two rogues, claiming to be gifted weavers, convinced the emperor that they could weave wonderful cloth visible only to those of pure heart and spirit. A grand procession was planned for the emperor to display his new finery. But neither the emperor nor his subjects wanted to be seen as less than pure of heart. So the emperor strode naked down the boulevard while his subjects cheered and clapped. However, the bubble burst when an innocent child loudly exclaimed, for the whole kingdom to hear, that the emperor had nothing on at all. He had no clothes.
Patriarch Kirill, leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, recently said that Ukraine is not ready for an independent church. This statement brought back memories of the Danish fairy tale. Indeed, no one wants to tell this “emperor” that -- not only does he not have any legal standing or canonical jurisdiction, i.e. “clothes” -- over the church in Ukraine, but that he is usurping the authority granted to the Moscow Patriarchate in 1591.
Patriarch Kirill, like many of his predecessors, is convinced that the Russian Orthodox Church must be an instrument of Russian national identity, and that the establishment of independent Orthodox churches within the former U.S.S.R. would weaken both the church’s and the Kremlin’s shared imperialistic ideology. In fact, while still Metropolitan of Smolensk, Kirill once stated that “the Russian Orthodox Church holds de facto first place among all other Orthodox churches…and exercises influence in all other Orthodox churches in the Balkans as well as in those countries where Orthodox faithful represent a minority. We are rightful heirs of Byzantium.”
This expansionist concept of Moscow’s pretensions to primacy and interference in the affairs of other Orthodox churches was expounded by the controversial, ultra-nationalist Metropolitan Ioann after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was to become a mechanism by which the imperialistic ideology of Russia would be maintained and rebuilt. It is based on three major principles/peculiarities: territorial, ethnic/national and pastoral. Constantinople’s Patriarch Bartholomew characterized this theory as “foolish, hubristic, and blasphemous…”
We need not concern ourselves with all three principles, because only the first is supported by Orthodox canon law and tradition and determines whether Moscow’s patriarch has any standing when commenting on Ukraine’s readiness for an independent church. The other two are universally rejected by Orthodoxy.
Starting from Kyivan Rus in 988 until 1686, the metropolis of Kyiv prospered under the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In the 11th century it was the metropolis of Kyiv, not Moscow (a largely unknown entity at the time), that was categorically listed on the 61st position as a separate ecclesial entity in the constitutional record of metropolis, archbishoprics and bishoprics.
Even as late as 1591, Moscow laid no claim to the Kyiv See, and accepted the territorial limitations of the Golden Seal Certificate of Constantinople which validated the establishment of the Moscow Patriarchate by defining the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church as the Church of Russia and the far northern parts, but excluding the metropolis of Kyiv and Lesser Rus. This territorial limitation of the Russian Church is clear and unambiguous; and remains, to this day, the primary source of the Moscow Patriarchate’s authority and jurisdiction.
However, after the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654, when much of Ukraine was joined with Russia, the Ukrainian church recognized its vulnerability to absorption by the Moscow Patriarchate. Metropolitan Kosiv of Kyiv refused to send his entourage to attend treaty ceremonies, and even threatened to fight Muscovite intruders for building fortifications near St. Sophia’s Monastery. Many Ukrainian clergymen were prepared to lock themselves in monasteries and “die rather than accept the rule of the Metropolitan from Moscow.” Thirty years later, in 1685, Moscow, with the help of hetman Ivan Samoilovych, orchestrated the fraudulent election of Bishop Gideon as head of the Kyiv See -- an investiture that was recognized as illegitimate by Ukrainian clergy. Bishop Gideon, in turn, repaid the favor by accepting subordination to Moscow.
Immediately after Bishop Gideon’s election, Moscow began pressuring Dionisius, Constantinople’s patriarch, for ratification of the transfer. At first he refused to condone Moscow’s action, but the combination of “sable furs and two hundred gold coins” from the tsar, and pressure from the Ottoman Vizier (who had also received precious Moscow gifts), caused him to cede to Moscow’s wishes.
Although Patriarch Kirill characterized this scandalous history of fraud, intimidation, and bribery as the “mysterious transformation” of the Kyiv See into the Moscow Patriarchate, he conveniently forgets that -- shortly thereafter -- the Eastern hierarchs called a Church Council and forced Dionisius to step down because of his consent to the non-canonical transfer. The Council unequivocally declared that the canonical territories of the Moscow Patriarchate include only the lands under its control since its inception -- i.e. as of 1589, less Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the Baltic states. The Ecumenical See of Constantinople never accepted Moscow’s authority over Ukraine’s Church and still recognizes the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as an integral part of its jurisdiction.
There is one very important element crucial to this discussion. A fundamental Orthodox ecclesiological principle is the territorial-canonical limitation of local churches. According to canons and Holy Tradition, the boundaries of every local Church are strictly defined. It is because of this principle that the Moscow Patriarchate operates as a territorial entity and is prohibited from expansion into the territory of other Orthodox Churches through political or military interference. Thus, Moscow has no canonical jurisdiction in Ukraine and its presence must be viewed as a usurpation of its patriarchal authority of 1591.
Ukraine’s Orthodox faithful need not fear Patriarch Kirill’s displeasure, but should look to their ancestral right – centuries older than Russia’s – to regain mastery of their church. After all, when it comes down to issues of canonical authority in Ukraine, Moscow’s patriarch truly has no clothes.


Author: George Woloshyn, a native of Kupnovychi, Ukraine, is an American citizen living in Linden, Virginia. He can be reached at gwol@embarqmail.com.