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Thursday, December 31, 2015

Old Ukraine-Rus' War Life in The Tale of Ihor's Armament: Military Accoutrement, Ranks, Activities.

by Ihor Cap, Ph.D.

The Origins of Ukraine-Rus'
There exist many theories as to the origins of the name Rus'. Some historians attribute it to the old Slavic tribe (rusy, rosy, ros') which inhabited the current territory of Kyiv in the 7th-8th centuries between the rivers Dnipro, Irpa and Ros'. Accordingly, this name spread to all of the Kyivan state. Other historians are inclined to ascribe it to Norman (Scandinavian) origins. To this day, western Fins still call Sweden Rus' and the names Rurik, Oleh, Olha, Ihor, Askold, Rohnid and Kindrat to name a few are thought to be Scandinavian by the West European writers of the 9th-10th centuries. (Zastavny, 1994, p.8) The name Ukraine is widely used throughout the 12th-13th centuries to mean Rus’. Ukraine is first mentioned in 1187 in the oldest Rus’ and Ipatian chronicles. Rus’ is not to be confused with Russia. The latter did not exist then. The name Russia only came about in the early 18th century under Peter I. Old Russia has its unpretentious origins in the kingdom of Muscovy which came into being several hundred years later in the northern lands of Vladimir-Suzdal. On October 22, 1721, the ever-expanding Muscovite state was officially renamed into the Russian Empire and its people were called Russians instead of the earlier known names that the world knew them by “Moscovites”, “Moskali” and “Moscvyny.” As such, all references to Ukraine’s ancient literary masterpiece, The Tale of Ihor’s Armament, take place on Ukrainian territory, in Putivl (Sumska oblast or province), Novhorod Siversk (Chernihiv oblast), Kyiv (Ukraine’s capital), and Sula (a river in Ukraine). (Zastavny, 1994, pp.6-7, 10, 23-24)
Historians believe that the city of Kyiv (a.k.a. Kiev) was founded sometime in the middle of the first millennium A.D. The conveniently positioned river Dnipro (Dnieper) was by it. This trans-European road “from the Varangians [a.k.a. Normans, Vikings or Variahy in Ukrainian] to the Greeks,” became an important center of economic life in the area.  Kyivan-Rus’ (a.k.a. Velyka Rus' or Greater Rus'), is the first Ukrainian state, which was founded in the late 9th century. The city of Kyiv was its main focal point that turned into a political center of the entire state. Kyivan Rus’ made quite an impact on European destinies. First, it protected Europe from the raids of Polovtsians (a.k.a. Cumans) and Pechenihy (Pechenegs). Then, having joined Christianity in 988, it maintained closer ties between East and West. The emergence of new cities extended the humble realms of Kyivan Rus’ and alongside culture and law developed an education. More than once, the druzhynas (men-at-arms) would deflect the attacks of foreign invaders.

However, as separate principalities gained strength within the Rus’ empire, they started separating from it. The great power broke up into many semi-independent state-like formations. Its successor state, the Halych (Galicia)-Volhynian Rus' (or Little Rus') Kingdom managed to last yet another 100 years before it too succumbed to foreign domination. The princes of Kyivan Rus’ were constantly disputing among themselves that eventually developed into internal hostilities. Their kindred history was all designated in the "litopys" or chronicle, Primary Chronicle, written by various writers such as Nikon, Nestor and others. They wrote it during some eighty years. The final form was completed in 1118. However, it was not the only chronicle written. Clerics, monks or the princes’ retinues have written others like the Kyivan Chronicle (the continuation of the Primary Chronicle) and the Halych -Volhynian Chronicle.
It was in the twelfth century, only two hundred years after accepting Christianity that they created the masterpiece of Old Ukrainian culture, Slovo o polku Ihorevi (The Tale of Ihor’s Armament or The Tale of Ihor's Campaign, a.k.a. the Lay or Slovo). It was an ardent call for patriotic unification. Unfortunately, they preserved The Tale of Ihor’s Armament in only one copy.  A. I. Musin-Puskin discovered it at the end of the eighteenth century, and this was destroyed in a fire in Moscow in 1812. Though, before its first publication in 1800, they made a copy of the Lay for Catherine II. Pekarski found it later and published it in 1864. Many scholars still today misinterpret many portions of the Lay and the manuscripts. They still have not deciphered many places. In this article, the author attempt’s  for a general understanding of the military vocations, activities and arms used then. These are all pertinent to Ihor’s expedition. The text used, here is mostly from the Primary Chronicle, translated by Samuel H. Cross, and the History of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (1st published in L'viv, 1936)  by Professor Ivan Krypyakevych, Lieut. - Gen. Mykola Kapustiansky of the General Staff, Capt. Sviatoslav O. Shramchenko of the Ukrainian Navy, Capt. Bohdan Hnatevich, Capt. Osyp Dumin, Lieut. Zenon Stefaniv, Professor Lev Shankovsky,  and Dr. Stephan Rosocha, along with other sources. Historians have written incomplete and fragmentary material about military events. Therefore, historians sometimes arrive at conclusions about the organisation of the armies, tactics and other important factors on the assumption of erratic sources. Sometimes they turn to the analogies of war life in other nations.
Medieval Protective Armour and Weapons 
Accoutring protective oruzhia in the old days for military duty consisted of the armour, helmet, shield and the weapons that they apparently somehow hitch or hook onto a person or the horse. In the very ancient times, the Slavs did not use protective armour, it probably came to them through the Varangians who knew many makes of iron arms. The protective armour was a type of scale armour where they covered their bodies with a harness, like a shirt, with a head opening and short sleeves. Usually, the shirt stretched down to the knees. The helmet was an iron head cover of Germanic origin. It probably came to us through the Varangians. Sometimes they made the front of the helmet such that an iron piece was covering the nose or a piece was added to cover the whole face.  To the helmet could also be added protection for the neck and ears.  On the princes’ helmets figures of saints would sometimes appear.  The helmets of Iziaslav Mstislav in 1151 and Yaroslav Vsevolod in 1200 had one. Shields served to protect the body for the ancient Slavs.  Prokopius says that the shields of the Slavs were not very big.  Larger ones probably got to us through the Varangians.  Sviatoslav’s army, in their expedition to Bulgaria, had long shields right down their legs for protection.  When they went to war, they carried their shields on their backs and then brought them to the front.  Some of them were wooden and painted on the top.  The Tale of Ihor’s Armament calls them the red ones (cherlenymy).  They covered some shields with aluminium so that they reflected the sun.   Others had many assorted decorations on them, or even some coat-of-arms.
The weapons that they either hitched or hooked on varied.  They were the sword, sabre, axe and bow with poison-tipped arrows.  All these typical arms belonged to the heavily armed warriors, such as the infantry and cavalry.  They also knew three varieties of spears. The “kopia” which comes from the word to dig, to hit, the “sulytsia,” to move, to attack or the "oskep.".  The ancient Slavs borrowed the name “mech” (sword) from the Goths.  They hardly used them for they were rarely found in the ruins on the territory of Rus’.  It became more known only when the Varangians appeared and they took it from the Franks.  Some swords were sharpened on both sides. Sabres, however, were sharpened on one end.  The sabre came to Rus’-Ukraine from the east, probably from the inhabitants of the Steppes.  It was longer than the sword and curved.  The sword, though, was more popularly used in those days.  A sword only became prevalent in the time of the Kozaks in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  It appears that the "sokyra" (axe) and later the "topir" (improved axe), came from the Iranians and was predominantly used at the  time of the Varangians. The ancient Slavs knew the bow as a weapon, but the inhabitants of the Steppes knew how to handle these weapons better. (Krypyakevych, I., Kapustiansky, M., Shramchenko, O.S., Hnatevich, B., Dumin, O., Stefaniv, Z.,  Shankovsky, L. and Rosocha, S., 1953)
Occupational Ranks and Activities in the Military
The druzhyna and voyi were the two main formations used in the army between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries.   A druzhyna consisted of heavily armed knights and the voyi who were the people’s (community) home guard.  Rus’ druzhynas of the Rus’ princes organized themselves after the strictly disciplined Scandinavian model of the Varangian  druzhyna.  In time they adapted it to the benefit of the Rus’ princes.   They did not characterize the druzhyna as a common people’s army.  It existed specifically for the upper classes, for the boyars.  Boyars were a class of people that held many portions of land.  They benefited in the joint expeditions with the prince for their economic and social interests. They linked defence strategies and trade with the prince’s.  This is why the boyars in time of battle fought hard, understanding well that they were defending their own interests and land as well.  The boyars belonged to the army voluntarily and going to war was another means of getting more land.  “From the chronicles we know that whole dynasties of boyars, from generation to generation, occupied the higher governmental positions and were members of the Princes’ druzhina.” (Krypyakevych,, 1953, p.14) The main duty of the members of the druzhyna was to be faithful to their prince.  If ever a boyar deceived his prince, he would pay dearly for it.  The easiest punishment was to expel them beyond the state borders.  The druzhyna divided itself into two categories, the elderly first (lucha, bigger) and the second category consisted of the younger people (otroki or sons of boyars).
Alongside the druzhyna stood the second formation of the army lines known as the voyi.  Simple townsfolk and peasants sometimes known as smerdi or black people entered the ranks of voyi.  Also, those residing in the Rus’ area entered the ranks of the voyi since they were members of the poorer class.  At first the voyi were not all that well organized.  In time of war the peasants would seize their arms in defence of their land and only later did the prince use them in organized expeditions.  For example, Oleh waged war on the Greeks between 880 and 882. When he attacked them in 907, the Chronicle stipulates that he took with him many “ . . .  Varangians, Slavs, Chuds, Krivichians, Merians, Polyanians, Severians, Derevlians, Radimichians, Croats, Dulebians and Tivercians.” (Cross, 1953, p.64) Another important group in warfare were the archers, or as they called themselves “luchnyky.” The bow was very well known to the Slavs for a long time.  Yet, the Polovtsians not only transmitted to the Slavs this type of weapon, but also were the actual creators of the light cavalry that they armed with archers.  Not only did the Polovtsians come to the aid of the Kyivan princes but they also entered the ranks of the archers. This, in turn, helped the Kyivites understand better their enemies and their weapons. 
Old Ukraine-Rus’ Warrior Tactics
From the earliest times the Kyivan army consisted of the infantry.  The Varangians were not different in their battles.  The heavily armed infantry in their harness of chain nail, helmets and swords formed the prevalent type of army in Kyiv Rus’ until the end of the eleventh century. Later, the heavily armed warriors relied on their horses and the heavy cavalry turned out to be the main force of the period.  Then the infantry took a second seat and was flooded with simple townsfolk. The cavalry, like the infantry, divided itself into two groups - the heavily armed cavalry and the light cavalry.  They armed the heavy cavalry to the teeth with their heavy equipment while the light cavalry, known as the archers, armed themselves with the bow and arrow.  Although the Rus’ warriors had their own horses, they did not train many to fight on them and often descended from the horses to continue the battle.  It was out of sheer necessity that the mounted Rus’ warriors saw that horses could benefit them in time of war.  The Primary Chronicle tells us that in 1068 the Polovtsians pillaged the countryside.  “Svyatoslav was meanwhile at Chernigov.  When the pagans raided around Chernigov itself, Svyatoslav collected a small force and sallied out against them to Snovsk.  The Polovcians remarked the approaching troop and marshalled their numbers, he said to his followers, “Let us attack, for it is too late for us to seek succor elsewhere.”  They spurred up their horses, and though the Polovcians had twelve thousand men, Svyatoslav won the day with his force of only three thousand.” (Cross, 1953, pp. 148-149)
Therefore, the mounted Rus’ warriors had to find a way of obtaining horses and more often than not relied on campaigns against the Polovtsians to get them.  Fortune favoured Sviatopolk and Volodymyr (Vladimir) in the campaign against the Polovtsi in 1095.  “Svyatopolk and Vladimir arrived at the Polovcian encampment, captured it and thus seized and led off their own country the barbarians’ cattle, horses, camels and slaves.” (Cross, 1953, p. 181)
Most of the time they divided the order of the battles into three formations, unlike the six of Ihor’s armies.  The druzhyna usually in the middle and voyi placed to the left and right wings.  Other combinations could have been also used - the voyi center and the druzhyna on each of its wings or the druzhyna and voyi together in each of the three ranks.   The disastrous foray made against the Polovtsians by the Severian prince Ihor, son of Sviatoslav, with his brother Vsevolod from Trubchevsk, and his son Volodymyr from Putivl, and his nephew Sviatoslav, son of Oleh from Rylsk, set out for the prairies in late April of 1185 to fight the Polovtsians.  The historical Ihor set out for the Steppes beyond the river Donets to fight the Kumans.  He intended to go as far as Tmutorokan' but did not get farther than the prairie south of Donets, Ihor met the army of the Polovtsi at noon that Friday.  He arranged his six companies as follows: up front went his light armoured warriors, Ihor’s son Volodymyr up front center, Yaroslav with Olstin and his Kovui to the left, the third regiment of archers to the right.  Behind them followed the most important part of the army, Ihor’s own company in the middle, Vsevolod’s on the right and Sviatoslav, his nephew, to the left of him.  After their clash with the Kumans, Sunday, after three days of fighting, the Kumans completely defeated the army of the four princes.
Historical facts often played a minor role in Slovo, sometimes just to suit the literal argument of the author’s work. Thus, in the Hypatian Chronicle the eclipse occurred at the Donets.  Ihor’s army was already on the march. To return home would have been inexpedient from the military point of view.  However, in the Slovo (Tale) it occurs when Ihor is but only in process of launching the campaign. Accordingly, Ihor could easily have let the projected undertaking await more favorable portents. From this shifting of the eclipse, the figure of  Ihor gains in knightliness. The Epic Tale by that emphasizes his fearlessness, his scorn of threatening danger (Gudzy, 1949, p. 167). The Rus’ princes were not even adequately prepared for war when they marched off. They did not even notify their godfather, the great Prince of Kyiv, hoping that they themselves would stop the Polovtsi. Consequently, the Chronicle recalls the sufferings endured by Ihor’s army. It states that in this three-day battle they lacked water  “and where  he had joy, now we had discouragement, and wailing spread afar . . .  and there was wailing and groaning.” (Magnus, 1915, p.xxxv).
Little has really been said here of the Polovtsi. Mentioning that the Polovtsians using the spirit of horseback-riding ability would only be fair, had the most brilliant cavalry known to history. They first appear on the Steppes in 1054 and took an active part in the wars of the Kyiv Rus’ princes. They established themselves between the Lower Dnipro, the northern shore of the Black Sea and the Lower Don. From this base the Polovtsi invaded and pillaged the land of Rus’. The Polovtsi made more than fifty-three attacks on the Rus’ state during their stay leading up to the battle in 1185. “Thus, one year before Ihor’s campaign, the southern Rus princes, uniting together with the Kievan prince Svyatoslav, inflicted severe damage to the Polovcians.  Of this the chronicle proceeds to tell us, one of seven thousand prisoners were taken, amongst them four hundred and seventeen Polovcian princes.  Even Kobiak was amongst the prisoners.” (Academy of Ukrainian Sciences, 1954, pp. 43-44) Though this battle benefitted the Rus’ princes, others did not, for they had developed the tactical skill of the Polovtsians under the stress of war. They had learned to keep track of the enemy’s movements while concealing their own. In manoeuvring for battle, they had learned not to depend upon commands given by a voice. Very often they could not hear in the uproar of the moving mounted men. Regiments signalled their movements by raising black or white flags during the day and by similar use of coloured lanterns at night. Whistling arrows that emitted sound through hollow, pierced heads were other signals. They hid their formations, at times, behind drifting smoke screens. They crossed rivers on ice or in leather boats. Although they knew that they had the heavy infantry or cavalry they fought mainly with arrows.  They avoided close struggles and strove to destroy their enemies from afar with projectile weapons.  Their secret of victory was as follows: they marched without preconceived plans and the host of wild men was hardly ever drilled, the armies were constantly ready to manoeuvre.  The secret was to keep the forces in motion while the Polovtsi waited to profit by an enemy’s mistake.  They could throw their stronger units against the weakness of their adversaries.  However, the coming of the Tatars destroyed their rule in the year of 1224.
The smaller Old Ukrainian 9th century state of Kyivan Rus’  transformed itself and its Rus' territories into a civilised medieval state and the leading power in Eastern Europe. Christianity was instrumental in destroying traditional tribal differences and in uniting the ruling class (the princes and their retinues) with its people.  Paradoxically, this development of a unified people from a previous collection of tribes in the end helped to destroy Kyivan Rus’. As the local Rus' princes became more concerned with their own principalities, their allegiance to the Grand Prince of Kyivan Rus' and their desire to preserve a unified Rus’ state declined.
By the twelfth century, new and semi-independent principalities arose on the former territory of the Kyivan realm; the Halych-Volhynian principalities in the West; the principality of Novhorod in the North, and the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal. This latter principality expanded into the Grand Duchy of  Moscow or Muscovy (the first Old Russian 14th century state) - in the Northeast. The new principality in the Northeast reached such proportions that by the twelfth century the prince of Suzdal attacked and devastated Kyiv in 1169.  The Rus’ princes busied in their useless quarrels were unable to put up united resistance, such as described in Slovo. The courageous Chernihiv warriors, who went on military campaigns against the Kasogs, Bulgars, Khazars and Polovtsians, were of little avail for neither time, nor the Mongol hordes had mercy on ancient Kyiv. The Tatar invasion in the mid-thirteenth century further weakened and ultimately destroyed the unity of  Kyivan Rus’, already undermined by sectional strife.  In 1240, the Tatars delivered the final blow to the disintegrating medieval state of Kyivan Rus’ by capturing and sacking the city itself. With the fall of Kyiv,  the Halych-Volhynian Rus'  Kingdom became the new political, economic and cultural centers on the adjacent territories of Rus'. (See Zastavny, p.38)  This successor state managed to last yet another 100 years before it too succumbed to foreign domination.

About the Author
Ihor Cap holds an Education Specialist degree and Ph.D. in Comprehensive Vocational Education from the Florida State University  and a Masters of Education in Instructional Technology from the University of Manitoba. Ihor is also a Slavic Studies graduate from the University of Ottawa and a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Canada.  This article was first published March 27, 2008 in the http://articlesandblogs, website.
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Krypyakevych, I., Kapustiansky, M., Shramchenko, O.S., Hnatevich, B., Dumin, O., Stefaniv, Z., Shankovsky, L. and Rosocha, S. (1953). Istoria ukrains'koho viys'ka. [History of the  Ukrainian Armed Forces], Second Revised Edition, Winnipeg,: Published by Ivan Tyktor, Ukrainian Book Club.
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Internet Resources Electronic Library of Ancient Ukrainian Literature

The Forces Of Leadership

by Ihor Cap, Ph.D.

Thinking about leadership can be represented by two major orientations, one emphasizing the transactional nature of leadership and the other emphasizing the transformational (Burns, 1979).  To this point, these two orientations continue to receive considerable emphasis in the literature.  The reason for this emphasis was suggested by Peters and Waterman (1982) when they stated that "an effective leader must be the master of two ends of the spectrum:  ideas at the highest level of abstraction and actions at the most mundane level of detail" (p.287).

          This article, then, attempts to identify and describe some of the elements of "effectiveness" characteristic of these two orientations.  In the discussions that follow, relevant definitions, models and examples will be emphasized, but the focus of attention will frequently be on thoughts congruous to each orientation.  Concerns for a unified perspective of leadership and a model important to the development of such a perspective become the key focus areas of the final section of this article.  Discussions in this article are subsumed under the following headings:  (a) the characteristics of transactional leadership; (b) the characteristics of transformational leadership; and (c) toward a comprehensive view of leadership.


          According to Hersey and Blanchard (1988), most managers "...agree that leadership is the process of influencing the activities of an individual or a group in efforts toward goal achievement in a given situation" (p.86).  This definition simply asserts that leadership frequently deals with the instrumental or day to day management needs and transactions (i.e. performance or job accountability, exchanging a favor, returning a request) between the leader and the followers to achieve subunit goals (Sergiovanni and Starratt, 1988).  However, the process of effectively managing these coping needs is subject to the leader's diagnostic ability and adaptability in leadership style (Hersey and Blanchard, 1988).  Hersey and Blanchard's model of situational leadership is a popular and useful framework for understanding and guiding transactions essential to continuous change.

          Utilizing a four”‘quadrant format, they suggest that the "best" leadership style is the one that matches the readiness level of the followers or group.  When the readiness level of the individual or group is low (unable and unwilling or insecure), they recommend a leadership style that calls for specific instructions and close supervision of performance.  This style is characterized by a high task and low relationship orientation.  As follower readiness increases or changes for a given situation a more moderate mix of guidance (task) and supportive (relationship) behavior in leader style is required.  With extremely able (knowledgeable, experienced, and motivated) followers, the appropriate style involves turning over most of the responsibility for decisions and implementation.  In any event, the emphasis in this model calls for four appropriate shifts in leadership style from telling to selling, participating and delegating, as follower or group readiness increases.

          In one important sense, Hersey and Blanchard's (1988) leadership model responds to the immediate needs of skilled school leavers ready to join the labor force.  Having joined an organization, these school leavers find themselves dated and out of touch with the reality of the business and industrial world.  Such a situation is serious for business managers, but is more acute for industrial supervisors.  In such an uncertain work environment, vocational guidance and support (the telling to selling acts of leadership) may require a high degree of clarity between supervisor and school leaver(s) in defining tasks, and of precision in selecting the methods and tools necessary to meet their job targets.  The product thrusts associated with these acts might be a shared perception by both supervisor and school leaver(s) of present "realities" and desired "priorities", directed toward eradication of greatest deficiencies and insecurities.

          As time passes, the leadership acts (from participation to delegation) may require a fairly predictable pattern of vocational guidance and support influencing a special subclass of controlled successes which Peters (1978, p.5) and others have called the "theory of the small win."  This pattern becomes evident as the worker gains in experience and as roles and tasks become more coherent in form and nature.  During this period, supervisors would attend to the sensitive "use of praise and design of positive reinforcement schemes" (Peters, 1978, p.11) for workers or teams with the goal of reshaping perceptions, thereby manipulating the course of interactions and outcomes congruent to the organization's eventual purpose.  Effective pattern shaping is further marked by consistency in developing and supporting small, clear”‘cut outcomes coupled with frequency and variation in praise or rewards ”‘ directed at moderate sized wins or completed actions in the hoped for direction (Peters, 1978; Peters and Waterman, 1982).  Setting or designing new improvement goals with resultant changes in behavior might serve as evidence of accepted proof of small new product thrusts about directional progress.

          In retrospect, changes in leadership style are inextricably bound up with changes in the worker's (or groups) readiness level about directional progress for a given situation.  From the perspective of the industrial supervisor, leadership is concerned with the systematic establishment and achievement of small, clear”‘cut product thrusts and outcomes through the use of positive reinforcement in task behavior (i.e., goal setting, structuring work) and in relationship behaviors (i.e.  praise”‘rewards, and socio-emotional support).  The remainder of this section deals with some of the mundane reinforcement "tools" of transactional leadership at the institutional level.

          The top manager or chief executive's ability to link "symbolic behavior" (basic management behavior, verbal and non”‘verbal) and "symbol manipulation" (providing behavioral cues to observers) with settings for interaction (the location for their systematic use) is at the heart of Peters (1978) case for getting things done at the institutional level.  Corporate leaders must go beyond merely communicating overt verbal behavior about the meaning of the organization.  They have to explicate meaning by "taking what can be gotten in the way of action and shaping it ”‘ generally after the fact ”‘ into lasting commitment to a new strategic direction" (Peters and Waterman, 1982, p.75).  Rather than proclaiming their intentions,  corporate or executive leaders can demonstrate institution building by being visible or noticeable to the "watchers" they wish to influence (i.e., virtually everyone in the organization they come into contact with).  They can exercise control of their symbolic actions by:

 ·       touching or ignoring certain topics in their presentation/decision review of memorandum    reports,

·       allocating, suddenly,  more meeting time to a particular item on the agenda,

·        introducing genuine accountability approaches to follow”‘up, such as tracking and noting    the impact of changes in the minute”‘book, and

·        managing the use of their personal staff size, staff requirements, and probing allowed     (Peters, 1978).

                 Honesty, realism, and consistency embodied in symbolic actions of influence accumulation impart the character of effectiveness.  The absence or violation of these conditions,  "...especially if perceived as intentional, automatically destroys the effectiveness of patterned symbolic manipulation", asserts Peters (1978, p.14).  This, in effect, is the essence of symbolic behavior and symbol manipulation at the institutional level.  Actions precede attitudes (i.e., beliefs, policies, statements of public disclosure) in this "Do, then tell" leadership model.  All too often, executives reverse the logic by treating proclamation of policy and its implementation as synonymous (Peters and Waterman, 1982).  In short, their presence or absence and minor actions can reinforce or reduce in force, value, or virulence the impact of corporate policies, and procedures.  Their symbolic frameworks both reflect their priorities and directions they wish to pursue.  They continuously channel their attention to some activities and not to others to become unparalleled shapers and re-shapers of attitudes and corporate expectations.  Before long, the pattern watchers become alert to the impact of the executives and their time consuming efforts on each other that nudge the process or reorganization in the desired direction (Peters, 1978).


          In the language of Bennis and Nanus (1985), transformative leadership requires a reorientation of "conceptual arms."  Vision, or the ability to identify past analogies, synthesize these to the demands of the new situation and, subsequently articulate a meaningful vision of the future, is the key competency area embodied in their discussion of transformational leadership.  Around this competency, they have developed four leadership strategies which they believe constitute effective leadership behavior.  They are:

Strategy I:   attention through vision

Strategy II:   meaning through communication

Strategy III:   trust through positioning

Strategy IV:   the deployment of self through (1) positive self”‘regard and (2) the  Wallenda factor (pp.26”‘27).

           In other words, effective leaders are capable of (1) creating and communicating a realistic view of a desired state of affairs, (2) mobilizing the attention and commitment of self and others toward institutionalizing this new vision, (3) continuously integrating competing forces (internal and external) into a single harmonious whole, and (4) fostering a learning organization that is open to "testing" assumptions in the face of changing requirements to sustain longevity.  Similar single”‘element structural thrust focusers (i.e., dominating value, culture) have been used by Peters and Waterman (1982) and Peters (1978, p.15) for describing some of the more powerful high”‘impact "...signals (or accumulations of symbols) of attention" toward institutionalizing a new corporate vision.

          While the foregoing authors' starting points may differ, they come to view these high”‘impact focusers or competencies as vital transforming ingredients, essential to any definition of excellence in commercial companies.  Accordingly, many commercial industries took steps to solidify this sense of vocation for leadership ”‘ invoking corporate attention to leadership training and human resource development programs on the assumption that these competencies and associated skills can be learned (Bennis and Nanus, 1985, p.27; Fiedler, 1979; Lippitt, 1979).  Likewise, steps have been taken to solidify the development of pre”‘service leadership programs and quality of continuing in”‘service education activities of principals ”‘ (Sergiovanni and Starratt, 1988, p.200; Snyder and Anderson, 1986, pp.21”‘23) which supply the motive power for excellence in schooling.  In either case, these new developments signal fresh contributions to the study of excellence in leadership.

          In retrospect, vision, dominating value and/or culture are thoughts congruous to the nature of transformative leadership.  These thoughts have been labeled as high”‘impact focusers or competencies, because they are illustrative of high”‘performing leaders in the best”‘run organizations, schools among them.  Accordingly, organizations have attempted to highlight the acquisition of these competencies in their programmatic efforts.


          Two major orientations to leadership were presented, each providing a sliver of insightful characteristics but each leaving the reader with an inadequate picture of the whole.  This feeling stems from a concerned awareness that neither leadership orientation provides a synthesis of the elements necessary to form a more comprehensive view.  This concern is further demonstrated by the number of requests to be informed more fully of a unified perspective, yet one that still retains practical appeal.  The comments quoted were selected as typical of the feelings about this topic.

          Bennis and Nanus (1985), in Leaders:  The Strategies for Taking Charge, affirm:

If there was ever a moment in history when a comprehensive strategic view of leadership was needed, not just by a few leaders in high office but by large numbers in every job, from the factory floor to the executive suite, from a McDonald's fast-food franchise to a law firm, this is certainly it (p.2).

          Sergiovanni (1979), Professor, Educational Administration and Supervision, University of Illinois points out:

That leadership effectiveness models....need to exert a greater effort in capturing more fully the complexities of leadership effectiveness, and....they need to help us better link the valuable instrumental or managerial aspects of leadership...with the more substantive aspects of leadership (p.394).

           Huckaby (1980), Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs, George Peabody College for Teachers indicates that:

Approaches to leadership should be more comprehensive than most of the current situational models, yet simple enough to be easily understood and applied.  A combination of elements from prominent leadership models may be the answer (p.613).

           More recently, Professors Sergiovanni and Starratt (1988) observed: is left with the impression that we are still lacking a comprehensive theory of leadership.  Such a theory would not only elaborate on the essential elements of leadership but would show the psychological and logical relationships between the elements of leadership in such a way that their organic relationships would be apparent (p.200).

           Sergiovanni's (1984) hierarchical model of leadership forces, each of which interpenetrates each other, is of particular importance to the development of such a view.  The model not only affords "technical", "human", "educational", "symbolic" and "cultural" leaders a place in the hierarchy, but also makes some revealing assertions about their relationships to organizational excellence, schools in particular.

          The cultural and symbolic forces of leadership express those essential meanings, values, and purposes of the school.  They speak the vision in imagery, metaphor, symbols; in ritual, songs, celebration; in purposing, correcting, and modeling.  The presence of these two forces are essential to excellence "...though absence does not appear to negatively impact routine competence" (Sergiovanni, 1984, p.12).  The educational force of leadership expresses those specifically educational (in”‘ and out”‘of school) concerns whether they are framed in pedagogy or learning theory terminology, in supervision, evaluation, and staff development, in curriculum design/improvement or instructional program frameworks.  It is an essential force to routine competence; linked strongly to, though still not sufficient in bringing about excellence.  Absence of this force "...results in ineffectiveness" (Sergiovanni, 1984, p.12).  The human and technical forces of leadership are "...generic and thus share identical qualities with competent management and leadership wherever they are expressed" (Sergiovanni, 1984, p.9) and are not unique to the school enterprise.  They are expressed in words and actions of caring, trust, reconciliation, human potential and uniqueness via instrumental motivational theories and conflict management; and in bringing the vision into reality in and through sound management technologies (planning/ scheduling techniques), contingency (situational) leadership theories and strategies and institutional structures.  The presence of these two forces are important to achieving and maintaining optimum effectiveness (routine competence), though not sufficient to bring about excellence.  The absence of these forces results in organizational ineffectiveness as well as poor morale.

          Collectively, these forces provide educators and trainers with the requirements of building a mosaic of realities that characterize the workplace and society at large.  To embrace the transformation of one at the expense of the other can only strengthen the existing bifurcation between academic and vocational education.  Scoping a comprehensive curriculum in which vocational education occupies an integral place is desperately needed (Osborne, 1983).  Society has and still is committed to a wide range of basic educational goals, and "our responsibility is to assure that our young people have access to broad, comprehensive educational programs", concludes one educationist (Goodlad, 1978, p.331).  If we can embody this notion of curriculum building with the mosaic of forces at hand ”‘ then future discussions pertaining to a more comprehensive view of leadership can be more deliberate.

About the Author

Ihor Cap is Program Development Coordinator with Manitoba Competitiveness, Training and Trade, Industry and Workforce Development, Apprenticeship Branch, Program Standards Unit. He holds an Education Specialist degree and Ph.D. in Comprehensive Vocational Education from the Florida State University  and a Masters of Education in Instructional Technology from the University of Manitoba. Ihor is also a Slavic Studies graduate from the University of Ottawa and a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Canada.  This article was written in 1990 as a graduate student attending the College of Education, Department of Educational Leadership, The Florida State University and first published on the website on March 11, 2008.


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